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1. Introduction. 
Since the mid-1950s there have been repeated 
attempts at reforming the CentralJy Planned Economy CCPE) of 
the Soviet Union and other So~iet-type economi~s, i.e. 
decentralising economic decisions, activating markets to 
replace plans, using incentives geared to performance at 
market values. The frequency of these attempts and their 
reversals indicates both the intense pressure for reform and 
the difficulty of its successful implementation. The 
current round of economic reform involves the Soviet Union, 
with the "perestroika" launched by Gorbachev on his 
accession to"power in March 1985; Hungary, where the process 
started in 1968 has entered a new phase in the last three 
years; Poland, in spite of a spell of military rule; 
Bulgaria and from a higher achieved degree of 
marketisation Yugoslavia. Reform appears to have 
restarted, more recently and slowly, in Czechoslovakia; in 
Eastern Europe the only countries without signs of reform 
are the GDR, where pressure for change is reduced by its 
privileged relationship with the FRG and by its more 
flexible vertically integrated structure, and Romania which 
is regressing towards the Albanian model. However 
significant reforms are also taking place in socialist 
countries outside East Europe, notably in China and Algeria. 
The current round of reforms differs from earlier 
qattempts in several respects. This time the lead comes 
from the Soviet Union; it is accompanied often by political 
renewal Csee Soviet emphasis on glasnost:); it is more 
widely understood that a technological and sectoral 
restructuring of the economies to be reformed is necessary, 
and that reform implies abandoning traditional policies of 
overambitio~s investment, unconditional commitment to price 
stability and protection of job rights Cand perhaps full 
employment itself); there is greate~ op~ning to direct 
foreign trade with other economic system~ and to foreign 
investment, while the burden of servicing a large external 
debt forces the maintenance of these condition~. However 
the most visible, sometimes spectacular aspect of the 
current round of economic reform is the revamping of money 
and monetary policy, followed or to be followed by more or 
less developed capital markets. 
This papep chaPactePises the tPaditional CPE 
monetaPy, and financial system (section 2), illustPates the 
extent of CUPPent changes (section 3) which will be 
discussed fuPtheP in the papeps ppesented at this session by 
Zsigmond JaPai and Ales Uahfic; PetPaces the steps in the 
aPgument fop and the actual sequencing of monetapy and 
financial Pefopm (section 4); discusses some systemic 
constPaints and theip impact on feasible fuPtheP 
developments (section 5). The papeP by WlodzimiePZ BPUS and 
Kazi mi epz Laski consi dePs whethep the full-fledged model of 
mapket socialism might be able to avoid labouP unemployment 
OP handle fluctuations in the level of economic activity; 
RichaPd Portes consideps the international aspects of 
introducing capital markets in Eastern Europe. 
2. Money and finance under central planning 
In the traditional CPE money is ppim~Pily an 
accounting instrument of aggregation and contPol; financial 
flows are compartmentalised between entepprises and 
households, with a bank money circuit foP inter-enterpPises 
transactions and cash Cor cash-convertible accounts) for 
transactions involving households as sellers OP buyers, i.e. 
wage payments and consumption purchases. These financial 
flows ape adjusted passively to planned physical flows and 
to the degree of theiP implementation by a single bank 
monopolising the functions of commercial as well as central 
banking Ctherefope dubbed "Monobank" in Western literatuPe). 
Households savings CwhetheP voluntaPy op, when intended 
purchases exceed supply at centrally fixed prices, 
involuntary) can take the form of a small range of duPables 
including some production goods, oP cash or a limited Pange 
of financial instPuments (deposits, bonds, insuPance, 
lottery tickets); the balance of revenues and expendituPes 
of the population is closely monitored and forms the basis 
of cash issues; ideally it is balanced ex ante through pPice 
and incomes policy. Enterprises can only use finance for 
pupposes specified in plan documents; in this sense BerlineP 
(1976) talks of ·"documonetary" economy. 
Investment is centrally decided and allocated in 
Peal tePms while finance is provided automatically and 
intePest-fPee from the state budget to investors, who are 
subject to straight line amortisation charges on the 
historical cost of theiP investments and transfer back to 
the state budget any surplus which they may Pealise CoP rely 
on further transfers fPom the budget to cover theiP planned 
losses; however official regulations foP investment 
s e l e c t i on i m p l y a s h a d_o w cap i t a 1 c h a r_g e, see I'! uti 1 9 71 b ) . 
Credit is mostly· short tePm and ii also automatically 
available to enterprises to finance their working capital 
PequiPements necessary to fulfill theiP planned tasks; it is 
granted by the Central Bank at an almost symbolic intePest 
Pate designed to cover banks' administrative costs. TPade 
credit between enterprises is forbidden. Thus money in the 
tPaditional system is the unit of account, a two-tier medium 
of exchange conditionally to plan conformity, a store of 
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value in competition with inventories of goods pather than 
with alternative financial or productive assets. Money is 
an instpument foP monitoring and controlling plan 
implementation C"contPol by the rouble" is emphasised in 
Soviet litePatuPe), not an instrument foP economic 
management, except when planners lose control over financial 
balances, in which case monetary policy can be an important 
instrument for restoring that balance. Fiscal policy takes 
the foPm pPimaPily of diversified turnover tax rates or 
subsidies on commodities, and is indistinguishable from 
ppofit; income tax is spurned as an unnecessary intePnal 
tPansfeP within the state sector; a modest government 
supplus is the customary budgetaPy stance; government 
deficits are effectively instantly monetised. 
Traditionally CPEs are regarded as hoving a 
propensity for autarkic or quasi-autaPkic structure <Wiles; 
1968). In the process of plan constpuction first the 
necessary impopt PequiPements of planned levels' 6f gross 
output are estimated by commodity groups, then export plans 
are adapted to the foreign cuprency requiPements of the 
impopt plan; if a deficit emePges, over what can be financed 
out of resePves or fresh borPowing, unless import 
substitution can fill the gap output plans are scaled down. 
Exports are Pegarded as a "necessary evil", as a wi thdpawal 
from the domestic market. Planned trade is undertaken 
through large import-export state enterprises, specialised 
by commodity group, not on behalf of producers but on theip 
own account. Domestic currencies are not convertible into 
commodities <outside the sphere of consumer purchases by 
nationals), ·let alone other cuPrencies; exchange rates have 
a purely accounting role, with equalisation subsidies and 
taxes tending to make all planned expoPts equally ppofitable 
to producers and imports competitive with domestic 
substitutes whenever they are available; the economy is 
effectively insulated fpom the fluctuations in international 
prices and exchange rate. There is planned trade 
integration within the socialist trading bloc CMEA or 
Council of Mutual Economic Assistence <also called Comecon 
but only in WestePn literature; at present includes the 
USSR, the East EuPopean Six, Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam) -
as the result of the coordination of national plans. Even 
within CMEA, howeveP, tPade flows tend to be bilaterally 
~leared CmoPeovep within gpoups of hapd and soft 
commodities) and thePe is ho common currency, balances ;~ 
the so-called tPansfePable rouble being neither convertible 
in Soviet commodities noP transferable to countries othep 
than the Soviet Union, without ppioP mutual agpeement 1 
intra-CMEA tPade prices are usually indexed to a moving 
a v e r a g e o t i n t e P n a t i o n a 1 p r i c e s i n c o.n v e p t i b 1 e c u r p e n c i e s '. 
All in all, foPeign tPade transactions are administrative]~ 
detePmined and there is no automatic mechanism tPansmitting 
to producers signals about tPade opportunities and inducing 
them to take advantage of any such opportunities (see Brown 
and Neuberger 1968; Holzman '1974, 1976; van Brabant 1973). 
economic 
In theopy the 
equilibrium; in 
CPE's Monobdnk is the custodian of 
practice it presides over a regime 
of almost per>manent excess demand, i nter>nal and exter>nal, to 
the point of leading to the identification of the economics 
of socialist planning with "the economics of shor>tage" 
<l<or>nai 1980, 19:::2, 19:::6); this is the result of 
over>ambi ti on at all 1 evel s and price downwards i nfl exi bi 1 i ty 
but is ultimately made possible by the acquiescence of the 
banking system. Hence the move towards market discipline, 
i ncl udi ng cr>edi t discipline instead of automatic credit. 
3. The extent of monetary and financial reform. 
Monetary and financial reform presupposes the 
prior dismantling of central planning as a set of detailed 
physical commands to enterprises and sectors, and the 
implementation of a degree of enterprise autonomy and 
financial identity, subject to government poJicy exercised 
t h r o u g h i n d i r e c t i n s t r u m e n t s .. T h us t h e m o n e t a r y a n d 
financial institutions of YugoslaviJ, which first moved away 
from central planning, are the most developed in Eastern 
Europe <see Dimitrievic and Macesich, 1973, 1983); but 
especially in the last two years the pace of monetary and 
financial reform has been fast and accelerating. 
The Yugoslav banking system .includes- beside the 
central bank NBY plus the national banks of the federation 
members - 166 basic banks and the associated banks formed by 
basic banks, other financial institutions such as the Post 
Office Savings bank, the Yugoslav Bank for International 
Economic Cooperation YBIEC and internal banks <i.e. closed 
financial institutions internal to enterprises accepting 
deposits from enterprise workers and BOALs). NBY contr~ls 
commercial banks through liquidity ratios, reserve 
requirements, credit ceilings, refinancing. In 1972 the 
commercial banking structure changed from one consisting of 
commercial banks and investment banks to a mixed bank system 
engaged in both short and long term operations. Basic banks 
are formed by enterprises, internal banks of ~nterprises~ 
and other non-government institutions; they are regulated by 
organs composed of representatives of founding enterprises; 
until recently founding members of banks had unlimited 
liability. Associated banks formed by basic banks pool 
resources and usually handle foreign exchange operations, 
and tend to operate along regional lines. 
In 19E:5 a new law was introduced, with which banks 
were to comply before the end of 19:::6. The pew law raises 
capital requirements of commercial banks,. defines the 
limited liability of banks shareholder enterprises, requires 
the build up of reserves and encourages ~nter-regional 
competition. A new accounting law fro~ 1-1-1~87 eliminated 
the possibility of deferring current foreign exchange losses 
in enterprise budgets. The purpose of these reforms is 
that of eliminating the drawbacks of the Yugoslav banking 
system to date: the financial indiscipline in the enterprise 
and banking sectors, the taking over by the NBY of foreign 
exchange r>isk on enterprise foreign borrowing, the negative 
interest Pates, the lending to enterprises at rates lower 
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than the cost of finance, 
losses all round. 
the socialisation of enterpr>ise 
In Hungary, with effect fr>om 1-1-19:::7, first 
commer>cial banking has been separated from central banking 
by the Monobank - as it was done in Britain with Sir Robert 
Peel's Act of 1844, which abandoned the pr>i nci pl es of the 
banking school in favour> of those of the curr>ency school); 
then competition has been intr>oduced in commercial banking 
by tur>ning the Monobank lending directorates and some 
regional depar>tments into autonomous banks and creating 
additional commercial banks <competing commercial banks were 
already present in the USSR in the ear>ly stages of NEP, see 
Arnold 1937; CarP and Davies 1969). Three of the new banks 
have been set up with the par>ticipation of Western capital, 
namely Citibank Budapest, the Central Eur>opean International 
Bank and Unicbank; commer>cial banks however do not yet 
compete for house~olds deposits, reserved to the National 
S a v i n g s B a n k . T h e c h a''n g e i m p 1 i e s t h e g r a d u a 1 i n t e g r a t i o n 
and connection of all financial flows, and the replacement 
of budgetary gr>ants and automatic credit with contractual 
relations with banks based on credit-worthiness, and at an 
interest which is supposed to balance the loans market. 
Central Bank control of credit expansion is exercised 
throug~ indir>ect instruments ·such as reserve and liquidity 
Patios, rediscounting scale and Pates, open market 
operations <initially consisting of pr>imary issues of short 
ter>m securities); the way is paved for active monetary 
policy. At present it is felt that both the scale of 
r>efinancing and r>eserve Patios ar>e high by international 
standards, two elements offsetting each other but perhaps 
adding up to a higher> degr>ee of dir>ect central control than 
desirable or intended. A thorny question is the 
verification and tr>eatment of the portfolio inherited by 
banks, some of which consists of doubtful loans made under 
the earlier financial regime. Another is the organisation 
of housing finance, which is pr>econdition for the 
unification of the two monetary circuits of households and 
enterprises. 
Hungar>ian style monetary reform has been adopted 
in Poland and Bulgaria <see Daviddi 19:::7), and its necessity 
has been maintained in the Soviet Union by leading 
reformers; a first step in the USSR has already been made 
with the setting up of six new specialised banks, decreed in 
.July 1987. Credit-worthiness and financial discipline 
requires strict procedures for the recovery, liquidation and 
bankruptcy of non financially .viable enterprises; such 
procedures are now in force in Hungary, Yugoslavia, Poland 
and the Soviet Union, and a hantlf~l Qf bankrupt firms 
mostly in construction - are pro~dly l~sted by reformers as 
a major achievement. 
In Hungary since 19:::3, i.e. already before the 
banking r>eform, a bond market has operated with primary 
issues and secondar>y trading, for both enterprises <non 
state guaranteed) and households (guaranteed), with issues 
growing by over> thirty times (100 times fop households) in 
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five years to almost 30 bn Forint in 1987. Shares have also 
been issued and retracted though until now exclusively within 
state enterprises. The next tasks of the financ{al reform 
are the development of the role of financial investors 
<insurance companies, pension funds, savings association 
etcetera) and of an integrated money market with a unified 
interest rate structure, and the development of an equity 
market extended to households (announced for 1-1-1989); this 
will require a parallel development and generalisation of 
joint-stock companies, at present limited in number and 
scope. 
Simi 1 ar financial faci 1 i ties have been avai 1 able 
since 1986 on an experimental basis in China, ·where 
commercial banking has developed and the first stock 
exchange was opened on 1 September 1986 in Shanghai, 
followed by Guangeong and other provincial initiatives; 
there are eight "over the counter" centers in Shanghai and 
She n yang ~ ( i n t·h e L i a on i n g Pro vi n c e; by November 1"9 8 7 the 
value of bonds quoted had reached Yuan 300 mn, or US$85 mn 
at the official exchange rate; see Ellman 1987; on early 
experiments see Xu Jing'an 1987). Shares are still 
i l 1 .i q u i d , h a v i n g t o b e h e 1 d f o r s u b s t a n t i a 1 m i n i m u m p e r i o d s , 
and do not carry a vote. At China's 13th Party Congress in 
October 1987 it was agreed that stocks and bonds have a 
positive role to play in the Chinese economy at its present 
stage of development <Ellman, 1987). 
In Algeria, following liberalisation measures for 
enterprises and banks (maintained in existence by the 1962 
nationalisation but otherwise operating as in a traditional 
CPE model), January 1988 1~gislation has decreed the 
financial restructuring of state enterprises, which have 
been given new capital and turned into state-owned joint 
stock companies; their shares are giv~n a value calculated 
and revised by accountants and government officials. In May 
1988 eight state-owned but independent Trust Funds ("Fonds 
de Participation") were established, partly but not 
completely specialised by sector <mining, investment goods~ 
construction, petrochemicals, electronics, food processini, 
miscellaneous industries, services); they have the function 
of managing state ownership. In the Algerian approach Funds 
managers, rewarded according to the financial performance of 
their portfolio, which they can alter by trading with other 
Funds, are expect~d to effectively simulate the functioning 
of capital markets. 
In mid-August 1988 a special Yugoslav commission 
headed by Mr Branko Mikulic, the Prime Minister, proposed a 
radical reform of 'enterprises and of ~ocialist ownership, 
which would allow ~Yugoslav and foreiiners to buy shares in 
them; the proposal will be considered in the autumn by the 
Federal Assembly CFT, 17-Augustl ,· 
Other countries have been more cautious in 
developing capital markets, but some have been bolder in 
other directions: for instance, since September 19B7 once a 
fortnight the Polish Export Promotion Bank has been 
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auctioning foreign exchange worth millions of dollars, 
importers on behalf of exporters, ~t a realistic rate 
exchange increasingly close to the black market rate. 
to 
of 
In the soviet Union joint-stock companies are 
reported to have been set up "spontaneously" by state 
enterprises or agencies, seeing that inter-enterprise 
agreements of this kind are not actually forbidden by Law. 
For instance, in Leningrad there are now two "commercial 
joint stock" banks, set up by the Ministry of Chemical 
Equipment CMinkhimashl and that of Energy Technology 
CEnergomashl to finance export promotion and domestic 
t apparently empowered to issue ~onds and accept ~:~o~~~=· in foreign currencies as well as 1n roubles CFT, 12 
August 1988). At the end of July 1988 Unesheconombank - the 
soviet Bank of Foreign Economic Affairs and the 
Eurocard/Eurocheque and Mastercard organisations signed a 
licencing agreement extending credit .c~rd .and. che~ue 
facilities first to foreigners <in compet1t1on w1th In!ur1st 
which has signed a similar agreement with Uisa) then, 1n !he 
second year of operation, to 150,000-200~0?0 Sov~et 
diplomats, business executives and techn1c1ans w1th 
convertible rouble accounts at the Foreign Econom~c Aff~irs 
Bank. savings banks also have been involved in d1scuss1ons 
about issueing credit cards on their own account- a step 
towards a cashless society but definite~y n~t moneyless 
society. At the signing ceremony of the l~cenc1~g agreement 
Mr Uiktor Geraschenko, the Soviet Un1on f1rs! deputy 
chairman, took delivery of a three feet by f1ve foot 
Eurocard CFT, 1 August). This is perestroika. 
4. The "sequencing" of reform 
The importance of money in the reformed socialist 
model was stressed by Br~s C1964l; a pioneering detection 
and analysis of the early stages of this process in the 
1960s can be found in Garvy, 1966 and Grossman, 1966 and 
1968; a great deal of attention has also-: been paid to 
monetary imbalance and the definition and ·measurement of 
"repressed inflation" Csee for instance Portes 19B3; Nuti 
1986). otherwise the role of money and financial 
institutions under market socialism has been conspicuously 
neglected both in the classical literature on market 
socia)ism and- until very recently- in the blueprints for 
economic reform in Eastern Europe. Yet there is a 
compelling logical sequence in the argument for monetary and 
financial reform, which can also be i denti fi ed as an ac!ual 
and indeed normative sequencing in reform implementat1on. 
I t b'e a r s o u t M a u r i c e D o b b ' s co n t e n t i o_Jl t h a t e 1 em ~ n t s of 
diffe-rent economic systems cannot be mixed in just any 
proportions, as one can with a cake varying.ingredients to 
taste: onte limited markets for products are 1ntroduced, the 
argument escalates in favour of further extensions. 
The starting point is the inefficiency of central 
allocation of production targets and given physical 
resources to enterprises in the consumption goods sector: it 
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soon becomes apparent that it is more efficient to let 
consumer indicate the~r preferences for the kind of goods 
that can be produced with those resources, by signalling 
demand prices, instead of leaving output structure to 
central decision (even socially desirable and undesirable 
goods can be regulated by taxes and subsidies instead of 
direct commands). The second stage is the extension of 
this reasoning to inter-enterprise allocation of current 
inputs, sti 11 within an overall allocation of intermediate 
inputs to consumption; the third stage is the redeployment 
of a given amount of planned investment, allocated to 
consumption goods, between different sectors and 
enterprises. Gradually, in the fourth and fifth stages, 
both the level and the structure of investment are argued to 
be best decentralised to the level of enterprises. A 
parallel development opens enterprise purchases and sales to 
international suppliers and purchasers. 
These piecemeal extensions of the basic efficiency 
of market redeployment of scarse resources towards their 
mo~t productive uses trace a natural path and sequencing of 
economic reform of the CPEs. First the market for 
consumption goods, then for production goods, demand 
remoneti sati on, i.e. the use of value i ndi caters to measure 
enterprise performance and to take the given resources to 
their most productive uses. Then the market for factors of 
production, i.e. for labour, land and capital, both 
financial capital and productive assets; financial capital 
first between enterprises, then between enterprises and 
their own workers, then between enterprises and households 
as sectors; first for loan capital, then for risk capital. 
There is a tendency towards a "cascade or domino effect from 
the. acceptance of markets as il automatic iil self-
regulating mechanisms iii) raising the productivity of 
resources. Of ~ourse the extension from micro to macro of 
~he argument in favour of markets ~s not water-tight; taking 
1nvestment out of the planning sphere raises the possibility 
of 1 abour unemployment; indeed some 1 abour unemployment 
becomes necessary to accomedate the structural change 
produced by decentralisation. ·This problem, tackled by Brus 
and Laski in their paper at this Session, is often easily 
forgotten, since the comparative macroeconomic performance 
of socialist countries in recent years has been so poor as 
to tip the balance in favour of markets even in the 
macrosphere; or at least experience has shifted the burden 
of proof. 
In an economy such as Yugoslavia, where workers 
are entitled to a share of their enterprises• value added 
after deductions for interest, . amortisation and 
reinvestment, the introduction of shares makes it possible 
to recognise - by means of free share issues workers' 
contributions to self-financed investment and to 
entrepreneurial success CUvalic, 19871. Without such a 
recognition, the Yugoslav-type enterprise seems subjected to 
a propensity to underemploy labour and respond perversely to 
short term price changes C Ward 1967; Vanek 1970), as well as 
underinvest in self-financed projects CFurobotn and Pejovich 
1972, Furobotn 1980). Shares also enable the cooperative-
style Yugoslav enterprise to tap outside risk capital, 
without w~ich it is permanently dependent on central capital 
or relegated to small scale labour intensive sectors. 
5. Systemic constraints and reform alternatives 
Once the necessity of remonetisation and some kind 
of capital market is accepted two problems arise: il 
systemic identity, i.e. whether a fully reformed market 
socialism is reconcilable with the systemic and ideological 
premises of socialism; iil feasibility, i.e. whether it 
would be possible to develop further financial institutions 
while still satisfying systemic or ideological restrictions. 
Can capital markets or quasi-markets be reconciled 
with socialism? The boldness of the Hungarian or the· 
Chinese projects may suggest that this is an idle q~estion. 
Yet we must take into account the small scale, experimental 
nature and unfinished implementation of these projects, 
which may still be opposed, suspended or reversed precisely 
in the name of systemic orthodoxy. 
The question has a qualified positive answer. In 
all socialist economies there is a possibility of 
appropriating consumption goods for postpon~d consumption; 
why not then let people save in the form of money rather 
than hoarding goods, so that there is more to go round for 
those who wish to consume or for the state to undertaken 
more productive investment or more social consumption. If 
there is money there is a positive nominal interest to 
induce people to part with their 1 i qui di ty-yi el ding cash 
Ctoo much liquidity in the hands of the population is 
potentiallY unstable); in all socialist economies there are 
also lotteries. If private shareholding is diffused as in ~he capitalist ideal of .a "property owning democrac~", and 
1f_ shareholders' voting powers were restricted or removed, 
pr1vate shareholqing would be no different from a 
combination ~f fi~~d interest savings and lottery tickets, 
except that 1ts y1elds would be more justifiable than those 
of a pure game of chance. If shares were regarded as 
conflicting with socialist pri nci pl es then the very abi 1 i ty 
to save would have to be challenged on the same grounds. 
But _suppose a further restriction -which will ce~tainly 
rema1n_ at least for some time in a number of socialist 
countr1~s -that shareholding should be public not private. 
Would 1t be feasible to re~licate the functioning of capital 
markets under these restrictions? 
There seem to ~e two ready ~ade solutions. The 
first is the development of 
involvement in the management of 
a German-type banking 
enterprises; the second is 
the more specialised use of Algerian-type Fonds de 
Participation. · 
Banks control over companies is exercised in 
the Germany through the appointment of representatives to 
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Boards of borrowing firms, through direct shareholding 
(found to be 9 per cent of share capital in a study of 74 
representative 'quoted companies, Eckstein, 1980) and above 
all through proxy voting on behalf of those shareholders <by 
and large the majority) who have lodged their shares with 
their banks <see for instance Cable 1985a and 1985b). This 
institutional pattern was introduced as a consequence of the 
underdevelopment of capital markets in late nineteenth 
century Germany and is naturally suited to the rudimentary 
capital market of a reforming socialist country. Public 
shareholders, possibly also private shareholders without 
voting rights, could entrust competing commercial banks with 
the task of overviewing their companies and monitoring and 
promoting their profitability. However, the merits of 
German-type supervision of industry by banks are 
controversial and the system has come under strong criticism 
recently, especially in Germany <Gessler KommissiGn 1979; 
Eckstein 1980; Vittas 1983). The system is widely regarded 
as a second-best option; the dominating rdle of banks in the 
stock exchange is resented, especially in view of 
conflicting interests vested in different functions of banks 
as lenders, shareholders and advi~~rs to investors, their 
emphasis on short term -performance and the dangers of 
monopolistic practices·cwhich have attracted the attention 
"of the Monopolkommission, see Cable, 19:::5a). Moreover the 
German system generates a certain insulation between the 
real world of production and the world of financial values, 
which prevents the fulfilment of one of the main functions 
of a capital market, that of stimulating efficient 
redeployment of assets. More to the point, the German 
system coexists with a full-fledged stock exhange and cannot 
possibly be expected to function as a substitute for a stock 
exchange. 
The second feasible development involves 
exclusively state holding companies in market-making and the 
management of state investments; it is the Algerian 
solution. The establi~hment and ·the mode of operation of 
Fonds de Participation are very ingenious and original means 
of administering state ownership and simulating the 
operation of the wanted capital markets. Three problems can 
be anticipated, however: il the arbitrary and necessarily 
accounting-oriented valuation of enterprise assets, which 
remains an administrative act divorced from market 
verification; iil the understatement of profits if o~ly cash 
flows are considered, ignoring the component of enterprise 
profits which is made up of capital gains brought about by 
enterprise success, with resulting conflicts between Fonds 
and enterprises as to the distribution or reinvestment of 
prof i t s; i i i l the i n cent i v e s t r u c t !,1 r e of i n'd i vi d u a 1 
adm1 n·i strators of the Fonds raises a · di 1 emma: i n-di vi dual 
benefit can be seen as undue participation in the returns to 
national savings; yet without some form of participation the 
incentive/penalty structure of Fonds administrators is 
defective, and only too likely to be dominated by 
Ministerial presence in their shareholders' assemblies, 
leading to a perpetuation of central administrative control 
on enterprise capital. 
10 
A third possibility can be imagined, of relying on 
a competitive valuation of enterprise assets, generated 
within the state sector, as a basis for an implicit 
valuation of enterprise shares, with individuals barred from 
ownership but able to take risks and associated rewards and 
penalties by means of loans and deposits indexed to the 
performance of shares of their choice Cor by means of bets 
such as can be taken today in capitalist economies on a 
share index). Such competitive valuation of enterprise 
assets would start from a self-assessed valuation by 
enterprise managers. Realistic valuations of assets would 
be obtained if managers were forced to sell them to other 
enterprises that might wish to buy them at the declared 
prices or to revise prices so as to make such transactions 
unattractive <capital taxation being used to avoid 
o v e r v a 1 u at i o n by m a n a g e r s ; for a m or-e d e t a i 1 e d d e s c r i p t i o n 
and account of t~~ possib~~n mode of operation of such a 
scheme see Nuti, 19.:.7 and 19·: .. :•). 
Such simulation of capital markets would not 
violate any of the systemic-ideological restrictions 
indicated above, yet would have no side effects other than 
those of a true capital market. Although the effects on 
efficiency and distribution of such a simulated market would 
be qualitatatively simtlar to actual capital markets with 
private ·shareholdings, the impact of individual gambling on 
share valuations would be regulated at will by government 
policy through the agency or agencies entering indexed 
transactions or taking bets with private individuals. The 
basic equivalence of actual and proposed capital markets has 
an important corollary; if capital markets can be 
replicated without violating the strictest 
systemic/ideological constraints, in this way or in some 
other way they ought to and most probably will be 
implemented. 
REFERENCES 
ARNOLD A.Z. (1937), Banks, credit and money in Soviet 
Russi a, New York 
BERLINER J. (1976), The Innovation 
Industry, MIT Press, Cambridge Mass. 
BROWN A.A. and E. NEUBERGER 
International Trade and Central Planning, 
·Angeles, University of California Press. 
Decision in Soviet 
< eds.) 
Berkeley 
( 196:::) J 
& Los 
BRUS W. ( 1964), Ogol ne problemy funkcjonowani a 
gospodarki socjalistycznej, PWE, Warsaw, translated into 
English under the title: The market i~_a socialist economy, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul,· London 1972 · 
CABLE .J. R. ( 19:::sa l, "The bank-industry rel ati onshi p in 
West Germany: perfof'mance and policy aspects", in Schwalbach 
<Ed.l, Industry structure and performance, Edition Sigma, 
BeT"l in 198.5 
CABLE J.R. <19:::.5bl, "Capital market information and 
industrial performance: the role of West Gr~rman Banks " The 
Econonl'i c Journal, March, pp. 1 Hl-132 
1'1 
CARR E.H. and DAVIES R.W. (1969), Foundations of a 
planned economy, 1926-29, Vol. 1, Macmillan, London 
DAVIDDI R. ( 19:37), "Monetaf'y f'efof'ms in Bul Qaf'i a", 
Confef'ence paper', EUI, Flof'ence 
DIMITRIEVIC D. and MACESICH G. (1973), Monetaf'y finance 
in contempof'af'y Yugoslavia, Pf'aegef', New Yof'k 
DIMITRIEVIC D. and MACESICH G. (1983), Money and 
finance in Yugoslavia, Pf'aegep, New Yof'k 
ECKSTEIN W. (1980), The Pole of the banks in COT'POT'ate 
concentf'ation in West Gef'many, Zeitschf'ift fuf' die gesamte 
Staatswi ssenschaft, 136, pp. 46.5-482. 
ELLMAN M. (19:::7), "China's OTC maf'kets", Confef'ence 
Paper', SSEES, London; fof'thcoming in ACES. 
FUROBOTN E.G. C19:::o), "The socialist labof'-managed fif'm 
and bank-financed investment: some theof'etical issues" 
. Jouf'nal of Compaf'ative Economics, Vol. 4, n.:2, pp. 184-191. 
FUROBOTN E.G. and · PE.JOVICH S. ( 197:2), "PT'opef'ty f'i ghts 
a n d e co n·o m i c t h eo T' y : .a s u T' v e y of T' e c e n t l i t e T' at u T' e " , .J o u T' n a l 
of E con om i c L i't e T' at u T' e, v o 1 . 1 0, n . 3-4, p p . 1 1 3 7-1 1 6:2 . 
GARVEY G. C1966), Money, banking and Cf'edit in Eastef'n 
EuPope, New Yof'k, Fedef'al Resepve Bank of New Yof'k. 
GESSLER KOMMISSION (1979), Bef'icht dep 
Studienkommission GT'undsatzff'agen def' Kf'editwif'tschaft, 
Schf'iftenf'eihe des BMF No. :28, CRepopt of the Study 
Commission: basic questions of Cf'edit economics, BMF Sef'ies 
n. :2:::), Ff'i tz Knapp Vef'l ag, FPankfupt. 
GROSSMAN G. (1966), "Gold and the SWOT'd: money in the 
Soviet command economy", in Industf'ialization in Two 
Systems: Essays in Honor' of Alexander" Gef'schenkPon, edited 
by H. Rosovsky, New Yof'k, .John Wiley & Sons. 
GROSSMAN G. C196B) CEd.), Money and Plan, UnivePsity of 
Califof'nia Pf'ess, Bef'keley and Los Angeles. 
HOLZMAN F.D. (1974), FoPeign tf'ade under' central 
planning, Haf'Vaf'd U. P., Cambf'i dge Mass. 
HOLZMAN F.D. <1976), Intef'national tf'ade under 
communism: politics and economics, Macmillan, London 
KORNAI .J. (19::10), The Economics of Shof'tage, :2 vols., 
Amstef'dam, Nof'th Holland. 
KORNAI .J. (1982), Growth, Shof'tage and Efficiency, 
Oxfopd: Blackwell. 
KORNAI .J. (19136), "The soft budget constPaint", Kyklos, 
VOl , 39, n. 1, p p. 3-30 
NUTI D.M. (1971), "The evolution of Polish investment 
planning", .Jahf'buch def' Wif'tschaft Osteupopas, Band 3, 
Munich and Vienna, pp. 395-438. 
NUTI D. M. C 1986), "Hidden and T'epf'essed i nfl ati on in 
Soviet-type economies~ definitions, measupements and 
stabilisation", Contf'ibwtions to Political Economy, Vol .. 5, pp, 37-13:2. 
NUTI D.M. C1987), '"Financial Inno_vation under' maf'ket 
so c i a 1 i s m " , E U I W o T' k i n g... P a p e T' no • ::1 7 2 1:1.5 , a l so i n H u n g aT' i a n 
in Kozgazdasagi Szeml e, Maf'ch 1988. 
NIJTI D.M. C191::1:1), "Competitive valuation and efficiency 
of capital investment in the socialist economy", EuT'opean 
Economic Review, 32, pp, 2-6. 
PORTES 1~. (191:13), "The theof'y and measuf'ement of 
macf'oeconomi c: di sequi 1 i bf'i um in centf'al"l y planned 
economies", Bi T'kbeck College Discussion Papep, no. 161, 
12 
October'. y 1 v 1 a· theof'y UVALIC M. (191::7), ShaPehold1ng 1n ugos a · 
and pf'actic:e, Confef'ence paper', E~I, Flor~nce and stf'uctuf'al 
VAN BRABANT .J.M. (1973), B1lateT'al1sm 
bilatef'alism in i~tf'~-CM~~et~:~:~a~ot~~:~;: ~~· ~~~~~:~:~aged VANEK .J. (1970 , . h _ 
Market Economies, Cof'nell UnivePslty_Pf'ess~ It aca. 
VITTAS D. (1983), Banks' T'elat1ons w1th industf'y, CLBC 
Reseaf'ch GT'oup, London. 
xu ,Jing'an (191:17), "The stock-shaPe system: a new 
avenue foro China's economic f'eform"' ,Jouf'nal of Compaf'ati ve 
Economics, vol. 11 • n.3, Septem~er: Study of 
WARD B. (1967), The Soc:1al1st Economy, A 
Organizational Altef'natives, New ~of'k~ Random_House. 
WILES P .. J.D. C196EI), commun1st 1nternat1onal economics, 
Blackwell, Oxfof'd . 
13 
